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STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 









BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Jerome Yeck, appeals from an order 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the 
charge of theft by deception, a third degree felony, and 
the judgment and sentence entered thereon in the Second 
Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Calvin Gould, presiding. The appellant also 
appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea to the charge of theft by deception, a second 
degree felony, and the judgment and sentence entered 
thereon in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
presiding. 
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DISPOSITION I~J THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
in the Second Judicial District Court was denied by the 
Honorable Calvin Gould on October 5, 1976, and appellant 
was sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison "not 
exceeding five (5) years," with execution of the 
sentence stayed pending appeal. Appellant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea in the Third Judicial District 
was denied by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., on 
September 23, 1976, and appellant was sentenced to a term 
in the Utah State Prison of one of fifteen years, with 
execution of the sentence stayed pending his appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the orders in both the 
Second Judicial District and Third Judicial District 
denying appellant's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 7, 1976, a complaint was filed in Ogden 
City Court charging the appellant with theft by deception 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-405 (1953), as 
amended; on April 13, 1976, another complaint was filed 
in Ogden City Court charging the appellant with obtaining 
money by false pretenses in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
d .. 1 § 76-20-8 (1953), as amended. (Record of Second Ju 1cia 
-2-
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District Court, hereinafter "Record-SJDC:" 1,2). on 
April 23, 1976, a complaint was filed in Salt Lake 
City Court charging the appellant with one count of 
forgery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1953), 
as amended, and two counts of theft by deception in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended. 
(Record of Third Judicial District Court, hereinafter 
"Record-TJDC:" 5). 
Respondent essentially agrees with the appellant's 
assessment of other potential actions against him in that 
the appellant was informed at the time of his arraignment 
and at subsequent proceedings in the Third Judicial 
District that the Utah State Attorney General's Office 
had also received complaints to their "white collar crime 
unit," and that this office was prepared to file additional 
felony charges for alleged similar conduct against the 
appellant. 
Charges in the Second Judicial District Court 
On June 14, 1976, the appellant was arraigned 
on the charge of obtaining money under false pretenses 
in the Second Judicial District Court. (Record-SJDC: 24). 
The charge was apparently dismissed as there is no 
further reference to it in the record. 
-3-
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On August 11, 1976, when the appellant was to 
be tried for the charge of theft by deception, the 
jurors were called and sworn. The State asked one 
question after which the Court and counsel retired to 
chambers. The jurors were excused and the case was 
continued to August 12, 1976. (Record SJDC: 26). On 
August 12, 1976, the appellant, through his counsel, 
Phil L. Hansen, moved to withdraw his plea of not guilty 
and entered a plea of guilty. (Record-SJDC: 27). At 
this time the Honorable Calvin Gould questioned the 
appellant extensively as per constitutional requirements. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Yeck, I need to talk 
to you for a few minutes. How old are you? 
MR. YECK: Forty years old, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And how much education do you 
have? 
MR. YECK: I have about, all told, your 
Honor, ten years of college. I have never 
finished any one field. I started in East 
Los Angeles in Law School, two years; went 
to two years to dental school; and three 
years to Maryland University, an ext7nsi~n 
course, while I was in the Army serving in 
Germany, Maryland University of Munich, 
Germany; and came back and picked up some 
courses at Westminister College and Utah 
University. 
THE COURT: And would I correctly assume 
that you have had some substantial experience 
in business affairs? 
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THE COURT: You understand what it 
means, the phrase cheat or defraud? 
MR. YECK: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: And you understand what 
dollar values mean? 
MR. YECK: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: And are you acquainted with 
a person named Richard E. Nilsson? 
MR. YECK: I am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, as you stand before me 
today, Mr. Yeck, you came here to the 
court room from your home, would that be 
correct? 
MR. YECK: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Have you had any occasion to 
have any intoxicating beverages or anything 
this morning? 
MR. YECK: No, sir, I have not. 
THE COURT: Have you been taking any drugs 
or anything? 
MR. YECK: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Have you been feeling in any 
sense ill this morning, other than maybe 
butterflies in your tummy from coming to 
court? 
MR. YECK: No, sir, I haven't. 
THE COURT: You are not suffering from 
any feelings of the flu or anything of 
that nature? 
MR. YECK: No, sir, not to my knowledge, I 
haven't. 
THE COURT: And you have had a chance to 
discuss this case now with your attorney, 
Mr. Hansen, is that correct? 
-5-
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MR. YECK: That's correct, sir. 
THE COURT: And as you stand before me 
this morning you feel that you are able 
to think clearly and make sound judgments 
and decisions? 
MR. YECK: I believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: If he enters the plea of 
guilty, Mr. Hansen, it will be with 
your concurrence, I presume, based upon 
your view of the evidence? 
MR. HANSEN: Not only my concurrence, but 
my advice. 
THE COURT: If you enter the plea of guilty, 
Mr. Yeck, will it be because you were in-
volved with Mr. Nilsson in a scheme of some 
kind which endeavored to cheat him or de-
fraud him? 
MR. YECK: I don't understand that. 
THE COURT: Well --
MR. YECK: I went into a business trans-
action with Mr. Nilsson to cheat him? 
THE COURT. Yes. 
MR. YECK: No, sir, I didn't do that. 
MR. HANSEN: By this, I have explained to 
you, Mr. Yeck, if you are going to plead 
guilty, it is tantamount to your admitting 
what they have alleged against you, and 
they have alleged against you that there 
has been some criminal acts involved here 
in that there were false pretenses. Now 
when you say you didn't intend to cheat . 
him this means in the law that to constitute 
a c; ime there must be an act and your intent. 
And they must concur at the same time, at 
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. Now if in fact you intended to pay 
him ~ac~ later, that's no defense. 
But if in fact you knew everything wasn't 
lega~, according to Hoyle, at the time you 
received the money --
MR. YECK: Yes. 
MR. HANSEN: Then it would be guilty. 
MR. YECK: I will have to go with that, 
yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Then to the --
is he ready to plead now, Mr. Hansen? 
MR. HANSEN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: To the Information charging 
you with obtaining money under false 
pretenses, a felony, what is your plea, 
guilty or not guilty? 
MR. YECK: Guilty, your Honor. 
THE COURT: That plea may be entered and 
stand. I suppose that we want to pre-
sentence referral? 
(Record-SJDC: 55-58). 
Appellant's sentencing date was set for September 
1, 1976, and he was referred to Adult Probation and 
Parole for pre-sentence investigation and report. (Record-
SJDC: 27). On September 1, 1976, appellant failed to 
appear for sentencing nor was he represented by counsel. 
A bench warrant was issued against him. (Record-SJDC: 32). 
On September 7, 1976, the appellant appeared but without 
counsel. The court continued the matter to September 
15, 1976. (Record-SJDC: 35). Appellant obtained new 
counsel, and on September 15, 1976, upon request of new 
-7-
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counsel, the court continued the matter to September 
22, 1976. (Record-SJDC: 43). Finally on September 
22, 1976, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea and the issue was argued before the Honorable Calvin 
Gould. The court took the motion under advisement. 
(Record-SJDC: 44). On October 5, 1976, the court denied 
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 
set the sentencing date as October 13, 1976. (Record-
SJDC: 45). On October 13, 1976, the Honorable Calvin 
Gould stayed imposition of sentence pending this appeal. 
(Record-SJDC: 46). 
Charges in the Third Judicial District Court 
Although the record is not as complete as in 
the Second Judicial District Court, it is clear that on 
July 15, 1976, the appellant was arraigned in the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Jur., presiding. Through his attorney, Phil L. Hansen, 
he pled not guilty to the charges of forgery and theft 
by deception. The Court set his trial for September 20, 
1976. (Record-TJDC: 10). On September 8, 1976, on the 
State's motion the Court dismissed the forgery count and 
one count of theft by deception and allowed the appellant 
to enter a plea of guilty to one count of theft by 
deception. Although the court's examination of the 
appellant as to the voluntariness of his plea does not 
appear, the appellant does not question on appeal the 
-8-
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the adequacy of this inquiry. Appellant made this plea 
on the advice of his attorney, Phil L. Hansen. The 
court set the sentencing date to be September 16, 1976. 
(Record-TJDC: 12, 25, 26). 
On September 16, 1976, appellant changed legal 
counsel. At his new counsel's request, the court continued 
the matter to September 22, 1976. (Record-TJDC: 13). 
On September 22, 1976, the appellant moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea. The court heard arguments from both 
counsel and denied appellant's motion on the basis that 
the appellant's plea had been made voluntarily and knowingly. 
(Record-TJDC: 23). On September 23, 1976, the Court 
ordered the appellant to undergo a ninety-day diagnostic 
evaluation, and on September 25, 1976, the court stayed 




A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA IS NOT AN 
ABSOLUTE RIGHT AND WHETHER IT IS GRANTED OR DENIED IS 
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
Respondent in no way contends that a criminal 
defendant's right to trial is not an absolute right 
guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment of the United 
-9-
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States Constitution and applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent argues, however, 
that appellant has confused the constitutional right to 
trial and a defendant's request to withdraw a guilty 
plea after having made a constitutionally valid waiver 
of his right to trial. The law is clearly settled at 
both the federal and state level that whether or not 
a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty will be granted is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. A 
less settled question perhaps, concerns differing 
standards in making that determination depending on whether 
the defendant made his request for plea change before 
or after imposition of sentence. 
At the federal court level, in Everett v. United 
States, 336 F.2d 979 (10th Cir. 1964), the 10th Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that: 
"Far from showing a 'fair and just 
reason' for a change of pleas to Count 
4, appellant demonstrated by his re-
peated statements that he had no 
reason other than wanting a trial on a 
charge of which he admitted his guilt. 
Unlike Gearhart, appellant offered no 
defense to the charge, nor did he 
allege involuntariness or any other 
factor which would militate against the 
correctness and truth of his guilty 
plea to Count 4 which was entered 
when he was represented by retained 
counsel. His contention is virtually 
a claim of an absolute right to with 
-10-
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draw a guilty plea prior to 
imposition of sentence. No court 
has ever so held; our use of the 
language 'freely allowed' plainly 
implies the existence of some 
circumstances in which a defendant 
is not entitled to withdraw a plea 
of 9U'Ilty before sentencing, and 
negates any absolute right to do 
so. Overwhelming authority holds, 
as has this court, that withdrawal 
of a guilty plea before sentencing 
is not an absolute right but a 
decision within the sound discretion 
of the trial court which will be 
reversed by an appellate court only 
for an abuse of discretion.I" 
Id. 336 F.2d at 982, 983 (Emphasis 
added.) 
1The last sentence of this quotation is 
footnoted in the Court's opinion as 
follows: 
V:i . .;q111~z v. Unitrd States, 27!) F.2<l 
34, ~7 (!lth Cir. l!JGO); Unitc<l States v. 
J,P~tcr, .•mpni note 10 at 500 of 2..\i F.211; 
United Stntt!» v. l'ancUia11~0. s1'pra. note 
1n. nt ~.'"!!) of ~fl<; F.~.i: \Yilli:1m~ t'. 
T"!1i11:•1l Sr:it"~· 1n~ F.~.1 30 . .io (;)th Cir. 
l!l;-J)): Con , .. l"nitc1l Stat<'~. ISi F.2•1 
I~ (!Ith Cir.) (p<'r c11ri:11n), l""r:rt. 1lenir4l, 
:: ll C.S. !>111, 71 S.Ct. 7:':--1, fl:J L.l:d. 
1:::-11 ( Hl:-il l: lk·r::cn ,._ l'nitrd !'t:it<'~. 
11~ F.~u 1.'il. l~G (Sth Cir. l~Hl: 
1·11it1'•l States , .. Colonnn, s11prn note 10: 
:-.t'C l"nitcd :-::tnt"s , .. TI11:;!'lil'~. !lllfml ll'ltl" 
1tl: J:ad1d , .. L"nit"•l State~. Gl F'.~•l 
::1;t1, :;t;:.! <Sth Cir. l!):}~); ~wifc '· r11itf'1l 
~t:tl<'.o.:, 'i:-l 1".!'-'. .. \pp.V.<'. :J'i. :: ..... ~. 1 h l". 
'..:!·I ::t~l. ::r.::! (1!11:-i) (1li«tu111); r_f. lfoyt 
\·. l°11itt>1l ~t;th•s, :!.-,~ l".:::!•I •Jl;O, -11;:! (lllth 
('ir. l!J'."",.";l .• \n•I s"'~ :'\nt1', ll'i/h1fr1111·nl 
n/ f.'11ilt.11 J'/crPt, ;,;J C1..lIX~t.L.I:n·. ::!GG, 
::!ID (lfJj:j). 
Jli:.:h v. l"i1it1'(l !'t:1t<'~. !Ht[>r<I nntc 11, 
JlO .lr.s .. \pp.U.1'. :1t ~!•, ~,.., F.:!.J :tt -t:n; 
1·nit .. 1l ~tatcs ,._ Jln:;ILC' . ;;, .... 11r11n noi(' 10: 
1 ·11itl'1l ::.:t.1te.;; c (;11,..rini. :!!!Li F.~d :n, ~! 1 
(Ith ('ir. l!Hil); 1'11itr1l St:itPs \-. :'.foorc, 
'.._!~)U F.~11 i10l (:!1l Cir.) (prr c11ri:im); 
c•'rt. 1l1·nil'tl, :-;n.~ CS. ~:-:-;, ."-::.! ::..Ct. -l!J, ' 
J..Ed.~·I 3..., (l!llit); Yasf}Uf'7. \-. l'nitl'1l 
:-::t:1f""=· s11:1nl uoti~ 1:;; ~·1.~t 1~l,_1~:~·~c~ 
, .. ~i~:rn. supru uotc 10 at•'•· _t,_ 1.-~. 
l 0 11 itccl ~t:1fl's , .. I.r:-:ter, S~f'~" ~i~t·~ };•l: 
1 ·nit1•d ~t:1tcs v. i\Ian.·u~. _] .• I- ·-11 _ _,t' 
~:::! (ltli Cir.L cert. d1~nil' 1 l. :~I-~ C.~~ ~'.!-!, 
-;;-, :--:.ct. ~!). D!l L.E.J. r .. ;o ( l!l:j-j I; l 111h.:_1l 
:--:r;1t1·s \'. l':1111•hi:111co. supra note 1~; 
\\'Jlli:1n1-: \". L"niti>1l St:ites . .<~lf[irtl nntc l.J; 
-11-
C:oo , .. United Stntes, rupra. note 15; 
:Ccr~l'n l'. enit('(l Stntcs, ,:.11prn. notr. 1;; nt 
JS~r-1$7, of 14;j F.2d; Swift l'. Unitl'd 
~tatf's, "m1u·c1. note 15; Unitr•l 8t:ttes \"". 
Colt1nna, su11ra note 10; UnitN.l Stnte~ 
,._ Fo~ • . rnpra 11otr. 10 nt r.n-r.n of 1!!0 
F.:!•l; ""artl v. T'nite1l Rl:tt('s, 111) l•".~M 
1:~a. 1:-:f; (lilh C'ir. l!llO): Rrhl"lf , •. 
\:nitP1l :0-::t:tt('i., ~.": )1'.'.:!1\ ::?f~'1. ~1;.1 (Sth <'ir. 
lH!.!!l); ~ec linit<·•l Stat<"!11 ,., :-:milr.y, ~22 
1"'.2rl 21-r:I, 2 rn (2J Cir. Jnr~'J) (11cr 
curi:un): c/. Tomlinson v. {Tnitr•l St.'ltt'!l, 
C.S U.S .. \pp.D.C. IOG, IOS, 93 F.:!d w:!, 
(>j4 (In3j). cert dcniecl sub nom., Prott 
v. United States, 303 U.S. 6-12, 5S S.Ct. 
G-1~. ~2 r,.1-;.1. l HY.l (ln::S): Iloyt ..-. 
Un!tr<l Stntc~. su1wa note 15; UnitcJ 
Stntes , .. Liao;, ~:tpra note 11. Rut cf. 
Knclwl'll "· Uniteil Stntc9, aHpra note 1·1. 
In the r""<'nt Xn9clbcrg cnsr, the Sn-
pnmc C'ourt held that the District Court 
)1arl l]isaction to ticrmit the u·itlulr:tw:ll 
of n i:;-uilt;r plea on n motion in wl1i<."h 
the GO\·crnmr.nt had ncquicscctl bcC':tnsc 
of ,Jrrentlant's utrnsh·c coo(•Cr:itinn. 
1.~he Court vncntr.•l the ju1l,::mr>nt of the 
Court 11[ Appeal~. :123 l•'.:?<l 93G C?il Cir. 
1na:n (Jil'r curi:uul, aml remnn1lt•\I the 
case t<• th<! Distri•·t Court (or further 
proccc1li11;:-s in con[ormily witl1 its 01 .. in· 
ion; it. cfol not di red thnt Jca,·c t~ u·1th-
dran· rite J•lca be ;:rnntc-11. Xagdher;: , .• 
lJnitc1l ~tntr~. 377 U.R. :?1'.tlt S-l S.C"t. 
12,,2, I'.! L.E.l.'.!.I 200 (!!>GI) (per 
curiam). 
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At the state level also, this Court has held 
on numerous occasions that a guilty plea is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court and that a 
criminal defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea as a 
matter of sight. State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 
P.2d 671 (1963); State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 
825 (1932). These concepts have just recently been 
reaffirmed in State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977) 
and in State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah 1977). In 
Forsyth, this Court stated: 
"The motion to withdraw a plea 
of guilty is addressed to the discretion 
of the court; and as in all discretionary 
matters, due to his prerogatives and his 
advantaged position, the trial judge 
is allowed considerable latitude in the 
exercise of that discretion, which the 
appellate court will not interfere with 
unless it plainly appears that there 
was abuse thereof." Id. at 339. 
This Court in Larson stated also: 
"A motion to withdraw a plea 
of guilty is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and 
a criminal defendant may not withdraw 
a guilty plea as a matter of right." 
Id. at 336. 
See also State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976); 
McGiff v. State, 514 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1973); and Meyer 
v. United States, 424 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1970). 
What appellant would have this Court do is 
decide against the great weight of authority and hold that 
-12-
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a defendant has the absolute right to withdraw a guilty 
plea at any time before his sentencing. Such a holding 
would make plea bargaining an ineffective tool in 
the criminal justice system because a criminal defendant 
could stall final disposition of his charge indefinitely. 
Further, to allow a defendant to withdrawaconstitutionally 
valid waiver of his right to trial only on the basis of 
his own self-serving declarations makesamockery of 
any kind of constitutionally valid waiver. A valid 
waiver is either a solid waiver or it is not: a defendant 
cannot have it both ways. 
Appellant's argument that he only seeks to be 
tried for the offenses with which he was charged and 
that therefore no prejudice results the state misses 
the whole premise on which his plea of guilty was 
based. The point is, appellant has had his opportunity; 
he had a constitutional right to be tried by a jury for 
the offenses with which he has charged. After deliberation 
with his attorney, by appellant's own admission one of 
the best criminal defense attorney's in the state, the 
appellant plead guilty. Two different court's questioned 
the appellant as to his understanding and his voluntariness 
in entering the pleas. Appellant is a man of considerable 
-13-
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education. 1 He in no way argues that there was any-
thing deficient about either court's examination of 
him. In short, the appellant waived his right to 
trial by jury. Since he does not contest the validity 
of his waiver he cannot now re-claim his right to 
trial merely because he has changed his mind. Regard-
less of any good faith he might have, there exists no 
court authority anywhere in this country standing for 
the proposition appellant now asserts. Once a 
defendant makes a valid waiver he must make some kind 
of showing (e.g. a "fair and just reason" as in 
the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction Everett v. United 
States, supra.) before he should be granted permission 
to change his plea. Appellant has not cited any 
authority, nor does any exist, that a defendant's 
change of mind constitutes a "fair and just reason" 
requiring a trial court to change his plea. 
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's 
contention runs against the grain of federal courts' 
and this state court's decisions on the issue of 
whether to accept a defendant's request for withdrawal 
of a guilty plea after a constitutional waiver. For 
this Court to reverse its past decisions and the great 
1The appellant, in response to questioning by the 
Honorable Calvin Gould responded that he h~s had about t~ 
years of college, including two yE:ars in law school, two Y' 
in dental school, and extension courses in Maryland Univen 
and in the Army in Germany. (Record-SJDC: 5 5) . 
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weight of authority in this country would be unwise 
and would work a most severe hardship on our criminal 
justice system. The two trial courts' refusals to 
allow appellant to withdraw his pleas of guilty were 
within the discretion granted those courts by law. 
Respondent submits that the trial courts' refusals 
to allow the plea changes be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities 
respondent respectfully submits that the refusal of the 
trial courts to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty 
pleas were well within the discretion granted those 
courts by law. The judgments and sentences of the 
district courts are without error and should be affirmed 
by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
